This paper presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government's counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, whereby the government cannot discern, based on past attacks, the militancy of the terrorist group. Policy recommendations are specified for non-event-specific intelligence in relation to the avoidance of spectacular attacks or unnecessary concessions.
Madrid commuter trains and stations on March 11, 2004 and on the London transport system on July 7, 2005 illustrate that offensive measures against al-Qaida may incite backlash attacks by sympathetic terrorists. In the recent Iraq Study Group Report, the authors state that: "The Defense Department and the intelligence community has not invested sufficient people and resources to understand the political and military threat…" (Baker and Hamilton 2006: 61) .
The primary purpose of this article is to indicate how a target government should tailor its counterterrorism response to an unknown terrorist threat. This tailoring involves not only the amount, if any, of concessions, but also the level of counterterrorism actions. Unlike earlier signaling models of terrorism Lapan and Sandler 1993; Overgaard 1994) , government countermeasures may provoke a backlash attack. Another innovation here is to permit partial concessions in place of an all-or-nothing concessionary response. A secondary purpose is to offer an endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars, based on a government's counterterrorism stance and the likelihood for backlash attacks. Spectacular incidents arise from a pooling equilibrium, whereby the government cannot distinguish the militant orientation of a terrorist group.
In the two earliest signaling models of terrorism (Lapan and Sandler 1993; Overgaard 1994) , the government has incomplete information about the resources available to the terrorist group. At the same time, however, terrorists are initially endowed with sufficient resources to send a signal corresponding to a spectacular attack, with the definition of spectacular given exogenously (in terms of the resource requirements). The main difference between these two models is that in Lapan-Sandler terrorists directly benefit from violence, whereas in Overgaard violence is payoff-decreasing in that it takes away resources from nonviolent political activity. Subsequent to 9/11 a categorization of terrorist types has emerged in which incomplete information stems from the differences in preferences that differentiate the Lapan-Sander and Overgaard models, rather than resource differences. For example, Hoffman and McCormick (2004) distinguish between groups that are absolute in that the terrorists would rather fight than compromise, as compared to political types that are prepared to reach a compromise that leaves something on the table for each player. Franck and Melese (2004) make a distinction between organizations that have chosen terrorism as a means to political ends and fanatics who have a predilection for violence. In their typology, political terrorists primarily intend to use violence to attract attention or communicate demands. By contrast, for fanatics the aim is more on inflicting damage than political communication. In Abrams ' (2006) typology, terrorists with limited objectives employ violence to win political concessions, whereas maximalist terrorists have demands over beliefs, values, and ideology that are more difficult for the target government to compromise over and relinquish. Finally, Arce and Sandler (2007) and Sandler and Arce (2007) explicitly combine the terrorists types in Lapan-Sandler and Overgaard to create a signaling model in which the target government has incomplete information about whether terrorists are militantly motivated (M-types) or politically motivated (P-types). M-types will only accept full concessions, whereas P-types will accept partial concessions. M-types expend resources on attacks if concessions are not granted; P-types allocate their remaining resources to political purposes if no accommodations are made. P-types are also concerned about losing the high moral ground from a never-ending terrorist campaign. M-type terrorists, however, see violence as sanctified and not as a (temporary) necessary evil. Such terrorists have an incentive to create backlash attacks in reaction to their target's response and may even franchise new groups for this purpose.
Based on these considerations, we would classify Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA), the African National Congress (ANC), the Stern Gang, Irgun, the Tamil Tigers, Hamas, Hezbollah, and most ethno-nationalist terrorist groups as P-types. For example, ETA seeks regional autonomy and self-determination over social services, schooling, taxation, and law and order. At times, ETA has agreed to cease-fires -the most recent ending in June 2007 -when they saw progress with respect to their demands. ETA limits collateral damage and directs most of its violence against symbols of the government. When more general targets are chosen (e.g., tourists hotels), ETA provides advanced warnings of bombings to minimize casualties. A political party -Bastasuna -represents the political agenda of ETA. In the case of PIRA, the Irish Army Council ended its military campaign on July 28, 2005, at which time it resorted to democratic means to pursue political goals. The ANC, the Stern Gang, Irgun, and the Tamil Tigers all had or have clear political goals. Recently, the Tamil Tigers suspended its terrorist campaign when it perceived progress toward the autonomy that it seeks. Although formidable and violent, Hamas and Hezbollah provide social services so that attacks have a real opportunity cost in terms of their political objectives.
In contrast, M-type terrorists present demands that cannot be partially satisfied -e.g., alQaida's demands for fundamentalist governments and an end to Israel, or Jemaah Islamiyah's demand for a pan-Islamic state. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (al-Jihad) is also an M-type group, now allied with al-Qaida. In the past, the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was bent on murder and presented ambiguous demands. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros (1968 Tupamaros ( -1972 failed to win over a constituency owing to its brutality (Enders and Sandler 2006: 17-18) .
One must wonder why a government may not be informed about the nature of the terrorist threat. Incomplete information may stem from myriad factors. First, the terrorist group may be new with no past track record -e.g., al-Qaida in the early 1990s. Second, the group may have just splintered off from an established group. Terrorist groups may have both militant and political factions vying for control. Governmental partial concessions may result in the genesis of a harder-line group -e.g., ANO and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which broke off from Fatah (Sandler and Arce 2003) . Third, terrorist groups may not claim responsibility for an attack so that the government is in the dark about the group's orientatione.g., neither the "Black Hawk down" incident in Somalia (October 1993) nor the bombing of the Khobar Towers housing US Air Force personnel in Dharan, Saudi Arabia (June 1996) were claimed. Fourth, multiple competing claims of responsibility may be made by groups for the same attack(s). Fifth, a terrorist group may acquire a new leader so that its orientation morphs.
Sixth, terrorists may purposely exhibit uncharacteristic behavior in the short term to enhance their bona fides with their constituency or expand their base of political support (Hoffman and McCormick 2004, Abrams 2006) .
Given this lack of information concerning a terrorist group's intentions, a target government may face two types of regret: P-regret from conceding to a group that would not have continued attacking, and M-regret from not responding with the proper counterterrorism measures that limit subsequent damage from attacks. P-types have an incentive to mimic M-types with a spectacular incident that might result in concessions. M-types have a rationale for holding back during their initial attack to curb the government's counterterrorism response. Such issues and the proper policy response are explored below, after the basic model is presented.
The model
Our study is based on a two-period signaling model of terrorism without discounting.
We do not build further time dynamics into the model because 90% of terrorist organizations have a life span of less than one year; and of those that make it to a year, more than half disappear within a decade (Rapoport 1992) . In democratic target nations, the government's time horizon is also short due to the turnover of policymakers.
We consider a situation where terrorists send a signal, [ ] 
to the government and a gain of ( ) 1 r S − to terrorists who accept these concessions.
We follow the unifying convention adopted in Arce and Sandler (2007) and Sandler and Arce (2007) in which two types of terrorists are considered -P-type (political) and M-type (militant) -as described above. This convention generalizes prior models in which terrorists vary in terms of the resources at their disposal, but always have sufficient first-period resources to mount a spectacular attack. When terrorist types were defined in terms of resources, they were either considered to be exclusively M-types (Lapan and Sandler 1993) or P-types (Overgaard 1994) .
In specifying the payoff function for M-types, we assume that they expend all remaining resources in a second-period attack and receive a benefit from their first-and second-period attacks. Prior signaling models employ a dichotomous government strategy set defined as {concede, not concede}. When the government conceded, it was a full concession so that there was little doubt that M-types would accept it. By extension, we assume that M-types do not seek or accept partial concessions. This is consistent with the description of absolute (Hoffman and McCormick 2004) , fanatical (Franck and Melese 2004) , and maximalist terrorists (Abrams 2006 ), a collection of terms falling under our M-typology. For example, the radical Islamist movement has never had a clear idea of participation in governance, or even much interest in it.
Purification is the goal (Wright 2006: 247) , which corresponds to full concessions here. Our assumption is consistent with M-type's willingness to accept (de facto) full concessions in prior models, with the added implication that partial concessions imply that less funds are expended on counterterrorism. This then increases the potential damage of a second-period attack by Mtypes. Effectively, the benefits that M-types perceive from second-period attacks under reduced defenses are greater than those from partial concessions.
In addition, M-types receive an increase of resources stemming from the government response equal to , br where 0 1. b ≤ < This backlash term is investigated in prior nonsignaling models by Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) , Faria and Arce (2005) , Jacobson and Kaplan (2007), and Siqueira and Sandler (2007) . The upper bound on b is justified because a response is likely to include defensive and proactive components, and only the latter is likely to elicit a backlash. 
P-types view their first-period signal as a pure cost and receive benefits for their remaining resources,1 , s − in the second period as they are applied to a political goal. With partial concessions, P-types receive payoff,
The first term in ( ) , P s r is the degree to which violence constitutes an opportunity cost relative to using resources for nonviolent political purposes. The second term is the concessions that the government grants in response to s. In comparing payoffs for signal s and response r with those of s′ and , r′ we find that
The terrorists' (senders') payoffs are non-increasing in the government's (receiver's) response, which is atypical for signaling models. When the government increases its response, this decreases the payoffs for either type of terrorist. By contrast, in the educational signaling model, an increased wage (employer response) raises the payoff for both types of potential employees, regardless of their intrinsic level of productivity. In addition, terrorists do not all wish to be perceived as one type, as is generally the case in signaling models (e.g., to be perceived as a high-productivity worker). 3 Instead, there are advantages for P-types to be perceived as M-types if this convinces the government to grant greater concessions to avoid a feared backlash. Furthermore, M-types can benefit from being perceived as P-types if the government's restrained response augments the prospects of second-period attacks.
The government's (G's) payoffs are zero-sum in attacks and concessions. If μ is the government's belief that it faces an M-type when signal s is sent, then the government's expected payoff is:
(1 ) (1 ) , for 0; and , for 0 (full concessions).
s r br r S s r S s r
μ μ
In the top expression, the first term in brackets is the expected loss from a second-period attack by M-types, 1 -s, which is offset by counterterror policy, r, and augmented by the backlash that the response provokes, .
br The second term is the expected loss for making concessions to Ptypes, while the third term is the damages from the first-period attack, s. In the bottom expression, the government makes full concessions and loses S − along with the first-period attack, . s − Against demands that correspond to "purification" or the loss of the target's status as a political entity, we assume that full concessions are too costly for the government; i.e., ( ) ( )
In an analysis of twenty-eight recent 3 Although they do not provide a formal signaling model, Hoffman and McCormick (2004: 246) also discuss the non-monotonicity of terrorist types similar to those examined here. 4 This reduces to
which is the prior probability of an M-type multiplied by the M-type's payoff from a second-period attack plus the prior probability of a P-type multiplied by the partial concessions received in the second period. In other words, the government has more at stake from fully conceding than the aggregate damage due to partial concessions. terrorist campaigns, Abrams (2006) finds the instance of total success -in terms of terrorist's expressed objectives -to be exceedingly rare, which is consistent with our assumption of prohibitively costly full concessions. In contrast to terrorists' types, the government stance is known by the terrorists. There is little doubt as to the terrorism stance of Israel and the United States in light of the demands outlined above.
The government's payoff function is essentially an expected loss function that is appended by the cost of the initial attack, s. Hence, the government's objective is to select a policy mix, r, that limits its expected losses given the cost of first-period attack, -s; i.e., ( ) , * . G s r s = − Another way to interpret this equality is that the game is zero-sum in attacks and concessions; hence, if we remove the −s term from both sides of the equality, the government's objective is to minimize the expected losses associated with a second-period attack and/or concessions given the damages done in the first-period attack. In this interpretation, the government's truncated payoff function is a loss function whose minimum expected value is zero; i.e., the government selects r such that (1 ) (1 ) * (1 ) (1 )
This response, r*, sets the government's expected losses equal to zero exclusive of the initial attack, and the losses are equal to −s inclusive of the initial attack, s. As the expected losses cannot be further reduced via a different response, r* is the government's best response given the terrorist's strategy, s, and government beliefs, . μ Consequently, counterterrorism policy is a function of the incomplete information that the government has about the type of terrorists that it faces, as reflected by the μ term in (3). There is therefore a role for intelligence to better inform policy, a subject we investigate in detail in Section 4. Briefly, under complete information, let M r be the government's policy when it faces an M-type group and let P r be its policy when it faces a P-type group. When the government knows that it confronts a P-type, ≤ so that the secondperiod "multiplier" effect of a response is less than the damage done by the first-period attack.
Pooling equilibria
Intelligence is relevant in signaling games of terrorism when the target government cannot distinguish between terrorist types and appropriately tailors its counterterrorism response. We have already discussed that M-and P-types may have incentives to mimic one another's firstperiod attacks. When both types mount the same first-period attack, the government cannot use this as a signal to update its priors about the terrorist threat and adjust its response accordingly.
Under the appropriate conditions (identified below), this game has a continuum of pooling equilibria in which both types select initial signal/attack level s, relative to out-of-equilibrium signal . s′ The groups are pooling on s.
Pooling equilibria are often sensitive to the beliefs and strategies that support them off the equilibrium path. In perfect Bayesian equilibria beliefs, are unrestricted off the equilibrium path.
Moreover, although defined for general signaling games, most signaling refinements are motivated by examples where the sender's payoff is monotonic in type; e.g., low versus high productivity in educational signaling or weak versus strong in the beer-quiche game. In such cases, the motivation for refining the set of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs is based on interpreting an out-of-equilibrium message as a higher-order signal. As we have discussed above, the game under study is non-monotonic in type, with each type having some incentive to be taken for the other type. The same holds true in Arce and Sandler's (2007) This set of beliefs recognizes the non-monotonic nature of types in our game by specifying no concessions and maximum defenses for off-the-equilibrium-path signals (attacks) that are less than the pooling signal. 5 It recognizes the incentive for each type to look like the other -through an out-of-equilibrium signal -and, through (3), sets r accordingly. Further, it is consistent with a no negotiation/concession stance that often characterizes counterterror policies.
Note that in a pooling equilibrium, the government's belief that it is facing an M-type on the equilibrium path, μ, is equal to the prior probability that terrorists are M-types. Hence, throughout the remainder of this section, we interpret ( ) this is the only path where concessions are a possibility (from the perspective of P-types).
Hence, there is no rationale for the government to update any further. Finally, given that a pooling equilibrium must simultaneously satisfy conditions (1) and (2), our assumption gives the following intuitive characterization.
RESULT 1: pooling requires the government to believe that it is more likely (greater than .5) to be facing an M-type.
PROOF: applying the assumption about out-of-equilibrium beliefs to (2) yields:
Cross-multiplying, we have
Equation (5) In prior signaling models, pooling spectaculars occur under full concessions; yet, full concessions are rarely granted in practice. Moreover, for studies that call the rationality of terrorism into question,
given the lack of evidence that terrorist groups successfully achieve their demands (e.g., Abrams
2006), we find an equilibrium rationale for terrorism that is based on pooling the goals of partial concessions for P-types and backlash effects for M-types. Furthermore, even though M-types do not accept partial concessions, target governments should understand the policy implication that partial concessions reduce the backlash effect that M-types seek to produce by placating the Mtype's target constituency, rather than the M-types themselves.
Second, we can endogenously derive the first-period level of attack that allows for pooling. Under the above conditions, equilibrium condition (5) reduces to pooling on an attack, s, which meets or exceeds spectacular level, s*, where:
In prior signaling models of terrorism, s* is exogenously defined as a large incident; whereas, s* is now derived in terms of the equilibrium requirements for pooling. This is novel for two reasons. First, we have endogenously generated the lower bound on the pooling attack. 
The greater the (prior) probability μ that the government believes that it is facing an M-type, the smaller the pooling spectacular attack. Effectively, P-types can free ride on the likelihood of M- Another comparative static result regarding spectacular attacks relates to the "toughness" of the government's no-concession stance, S:
The lower bound on a spectacular attack is inversely related to S. When a government is hard-line (high S), the threshold falls for classifying spectaculars. Thus, totalitarian governments view virtually any attack as spectacular, because any terrorism is a serious affront; hence, the tendency of these governments not to report terrorist events. Finally, we have
In a pooling equilibrium, RESULT 2: Spectacular attacks that meet or exceed the level of s* given in (7) are consistent with a continuum of pooling equilibria. The defining level for spectaculars is inversely related to the government's stance against terrorism, S, and its (prior) belief that it is facing an M-type. In contrast, the influence of a backlash on the defining level of spectaculars is ambiguous.
Another important value is the lower bound on the government's prior that it is facing an M-type, consistent with the pooling equilibrium, *.
μ From (6), it is clear that * / 0 S μ ∂ ∂ < and * / 0. b μ ∂ ∂ < Thus, the greater is the government's stance against concessions, the less certain that government needs to be that terrorists are an M-type for a pooling equilibrium, in which the government does not fully concede. Moreover, the greater is the backlash, the less certain that the government needs to be that terrorists are M-types for a pooling equilibrium.
RESULT 3: The (prior) belief that the government is facing an M-type, consistent with a pooling equilibrium, is inversely related to the government's stance against terrorists and the potential backlash.
The value of intelligence
In models with incomplete information about terrorists' resources or preferences, the value of intelligence stems from better informing the government on its choice of strategy. For example, Lapan and Sandler (1993) measure this value regarding whether it is optimal for a government to concede or not. Arce and Sandler (2007) instead identify a potential trade-off between conceding to an M-type versus decreasing the effectiveness of a second-period attack.
In these models, the value of intelligence involves the avoidance of ex post regret. Given a pooling equilibrium, ex post P-regret occurs when the pooling payoff is compared to the "noconcede" payoff, which is the optimal strategy when the government faces a P-type. Ex post Mregret is measured as the difference between the pooling payoff and the government's optimal policy when it knows that it confronts an M-type. We also determine the value of intelligence by comparing the government's ex post payoff for a given type under its pooling response with its optimal complete information strategy. Because the policy response is a continuous variable in our model, intelligence not only tells the government whether to concede or not, but also how to tailor its response in anticipation of a second-period attack. Hoffman and McCormick (2004: 247) similarly observe that intelligence is not only needed to find, fix and destroy terrorist groups, but to also develop an accurate picture of the threat the group is likely to pose down the road. Specifically, in our model, intelligence guides the optimal counterterrorism response in recognition of the response's potential to create a backlash that fuels the terrorist campaign, as given in (3). The potential for intelligence to inform counterterrorism policy distinguishes this study from prior signaling models and further illuminates intelligence's role as a complement to event-specific information.
We use (3) to ascertain the government's optimal payoff with complete information. For P-type terrorists, ( ) − corresponding to the concession that it makes and its losses from the first-period attack. In the pooling equilibrium, the government's response is given by (3). Substituting this value for r into the ex post payoff yields:
Since the value of intelligence is the avoidance of ex post regret, it is the difference between the complete information payoff, , s − and the pooling payoff above. For a P-type, this value, , P v is given by:
Case 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
The difference between the complete information payoff, , s − and this pooling payoff is the value of intelligence when facing an M-type's, in a pooling equilibrium, : ( 1 ) . (1 ) (1 ) (
We now ascertain whether a ranking exists between the value of intelligence to avoid Pregret versus M-regret. We have assumed that 1 , S r > ≥ so that the cost of fully conceding to terrorists (S) exceeds the budgeted response to terrorist attacks ( ) This observation calls into question the focus on P-regret in prior signaling models where the government either fully conceded or held firm. Arce and Sandler (2007) introduce the possibility of M-regret when, ex post, the government would have preferred a counterterrorism response to (full) concession. However, they do not allow for mollified reactions that include both partial concession and a measured response, nor do they allow for M-type attacks designed to provoke a backlash to the government's response. 8 In our analysis, the value of intelligence is almost always defined by the avoidance of M-regret. The identification of the nature of intelligence comes from our generalized framework that allows for a continuous response strategy that weighs defensive benefits and counterproductive backlash reactions. . In Arce and Sandler (2007) , the relation between the value of intelligence and the government's stance is ambiguous due to the discrete nature of the policy response, which allows for both forms of regret. Our unambiguous comparative static finding means that a tough stance to weather attacks is best served by investing resources in strong counterterrorism measures, which includes event-preventing intelligence. With a tougher stance, there is less to gain from knowing the nature of the threat since concession is less of an option.
Moreover, the ways in which s* and M v are related to the backlash term have important policy implications. First, it is unclear whether the potential for backlash increases or decreases the magnitude of spectaculars (s*) required for pooling equilibria (Result 2); yet in a pooling equilibrium, intelligence is required to avoid M-regret. Second, the value of information to avoid 8 P-regret is relevant in their study because, effectively, 0 b = so that s b μ > holds trivially.
M-regret is inversely related to the size of the backlash to the government's response:
. This follows because knowledge of b is effectively a substitute for intelligence regarding terrorist types, given that only M-types seek to create a backlash to the government response. If, consequently, the government determines the potential for a backlash, it then knows whether M-types have a greater incentive to mount a spectacular attack in a pooling equilibrium. In other words, intelligence should be focused on the propensity for counterterrorism to result in a backlash.
Separating equilibrium
We now consider the case where s M ≠ s P (= 0). In such a separating equilibrium, the government has perfect information about which type of terrorist it is facing at the information sets following signals M s and ,
Spectacular attacks are pooling phenomena
The trade-off between the additional benefit that M-types seek by restraining carnage in the first period versus the potential for provoking a backlash raises the issue of whether the upper bound on M-types' separating attack, s , is what allows us to label s* as a spectacular. Results 2 and 5 allow us to endogenously derive and characterize the value of a spectacular, in contrast to its exogeneity in other signaling models of terrorism. Instead of the conventional wisdom that Mtypes seek to distinguish themselves through spectacular attacks, we have the novel result that spectaculars are pooling phenomena. In a separating equilibrium, the government does not concede to P-types and it knows to tailor its response to M-types based upon the expected magnitude of the second-period attack and the potential backlash that the government response may elicit. Partial concessions are made in the pooling equilibrium to reduce the backlash effect of a government's response. This implies a benefit for M-type's because the presence of incomplete information means that the government's response does not fully anticipate M-type's second-period attack. Further, P-types directly benefit from the partial concessions.
Consequently, both M-and P-types have an incentive to create a pooling equilibrium through a spectacular attack, thereby preserving a situation of incomplete information.
Concluding remarks
This paper presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks where the government is uninformed about whether the terrorists are politically or militarily motivated. The former view attacks as a pure cost and will accept partial concessions, while the latter derives fulfillment from the attack itself and will only accept full capitulation. We derive a characterization of spectacular terrorist incidents as a function of the country's declared stance of toughness and the terrorists' goal of inciting a counterterrorism-induced backlash recruitment. Although M-types do not accept partial concessions, a target government offers such concessions to limit backlash, thereby reducing militants' payoffs. We associate spectacular incidents with a pooling equilibrium, where the government cannot distinguish the nature of the terrorist threat. That is, M-types engage in large-scale incidents to prod the government into a response that provokes a backlash. P-types also resort to large-scale incidents in the hopes of receiving partial concession,
given by governments to limit a backlash. In a pooling equilibrium, the value of intelligence derives from the proper policy mix of countermeasures and concessions to combat just M-types.
Thus, intelligence on the potential for a backlash serves as an effective substitute for identifying the nature of the terrorist type. This insight is not available from prior signaling models.
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